Environmental protection for sale:
Strategic green industrial policy and climate finance1
Carolyn Fischer2
Abstract
Industrial policy has long been criticized as subject to protectionist interests; accordingly,
subsidies to domestic producers face disciplines under World Trade Organization agreements, without
exceptions for environmental purposes. Now green industrial policy is gaining popularity as governments
search for low-carbon solutions that also provide jobs at home. The strategic trade literature has largely
ignored the issue of market failures related to green goods. I consider the market for a new environmental
good (like low-carbon technology) whose downstream consumption provides external benefits (like
reduced emissions). Governments may have some preference for supporting domestic production, such as
by interest-group lobbying, introducing a political distortion in their objective function. I examine the
national incentives and global rationales for offering production (upstream) and deployment
(downstream) subsidies in producer countries, allowing that some of the downstream market may lie in
nonregulating third-party countries. Restraints on upstream subsidies erode global welfare when
environmental externalities are large enough relative to political distortions. Climate finance is an
effective alternative if political distortions are large and governments do not undervalue carbon costs.
Numerical simulations of the case of renewable energy indicate that a modest social cost of carbon can
imply benefits from allowing upstream subsidies.
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Introduction

Green industrial policy (GIP) is the use of government interventions to support domestic
industries that have environmental benefits. GIP has emerged as a primary policy tool to develop
clean energy alternatives that can help reduce reliance on energy sources that emit greenhouse
gases. Rationales for GIP are manifold: the development of new technologies and industries can
create jobs and economic opportunities and combat climate change at the same time.
Furthermore, such industries may need assistance to become competitive, both because they are
“infant” industries still innovating, developing support networks and scale economies, and also
because their environmental benefits are not properly priced by the market (Rodrik 2014).
Carbon dioxide (CO2) in particular is an underpriced externality. As of 2015, only 12% of
global emissions were included in a carbon pricing scheme (World Bank 2015), and of those, the
average price was $8 per ton,3 well below common estimates of the social cost of carbon (SCC),
which the US Environmental Protection Agency puts in the range of $40 per ton. At the same
time, fossil fuels enjoy substantial subsidies in most parts of the world (IEA 2015). The general
policy preference for subsidies over emissions prices is evident in renewable energy policies:
nearly 100 countries and countless subnational jurisdictions offer financial incentives for
renewable energy (IEA/IRENA 2015), whereas fewer than 40 countries and roughly 20
subnational jurisdictions—all of which also rely on renewable energy support—are using or
planning to implement carbon pricing (World Bank 2015).
The policies range from downstream measures to support deployment to upstream
incentives for R&D and manufacturing. Downstream measures create markets for upstream
industries to serve; upstream measures support domestic industries directly. The distinction is
3
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important, both from an economic and legal perspective. With international trade, the policies
have different effects on global clean technology prices, and thus on the deployment
opportunities for export markets (Fischer, Greaker and Rosendahl, forthcoming). The World
Trade Organization (WTO) agreements create restrictions on industrial policies that distort trade,
particularly subsidies. Although downstream subsidies can generally be designed in a
nondiscriminatory fashion, upstream policies by definition offer preferential treatment to
domestic producers. The WTO attests that its rules do not impede supporting the deployment and
diffusion of green technologies (WTO 2011), but multiple disputes have come to WTO panels
over the solar PV, wind power equipment, and biofuel sectors, particularly regarding subsidies or
local content requirements for deployment benefits (Charnovitz and Fischer 2014, Cosbey and
Mavroidis 2014).4 Importantly, the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures
(Subsidies Code) lacks exceptions for environmental reasons; thus, subsidy policy may have less
leeway than tariff-related measures, since the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT)
does carve out specific exceptions for transboundary externalities like human health or resource
conservation (Rubini 2012).
Economists have long made a strong case against industrial policy, noting the potential
for beggar-thy-neighbor protectionism, opportunities for rent seeking, and the difficulty in
picking winners (Rodrik 2014). Should exceptions be made in the Subsidies Code for addressing
global environmental challenges? Or can alternative policies—like encouraging technology-

Examples: European Union — Certain Measures on the Importation and Marketing of Biodiesel and
Measures Supporting the Biodiesel Industry (Complainant: Argentina, 2013); India — Certain Measures
Relating to Solar Cells and Solar Modules (Complainant: United States, 2013); European Union and
Certain Member States — Certain Measures Affecting the Renewable Energy Generation
Sector (Complainant: China, 2012); Canada — Measures Relating to the Feed-in Tariff
Program (Complainant: European Union, 2011); Canada — Certain Measures Affecting the Renewable
Energy Generation Sector (Complainant: Japan, 2010); China — Measures Concerning Wind Power
Equipment (Complainant: United States, 2010).
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producing countries to extend climate finance to develop markets for deployment in developing
countries—substitute for upstream measures?
This paper extends the work on strategic subsidies by Fischer (2016) to look specifically
at the question of politically motivated green industrial policy and climate finance as an
alternative. This intersection is highly novel. Export and production subsidies have been studied
in the strategic trade literature, largely building on early work by Spencer and Brander (1983)
and Brander and Spencer (1985), who demonstrate that countries with imperfectly competitive
industries that export to a third market can raise their joint profits if they commit to limiting
production by agreeing to avoid subsidies. These studies tend to focus on the strategic interest of
the producer countries, ignoring questions of global welfare or correcting market failures.
Fischer (2016) points out that from a global welfare perspective, strategic countries tend to
underprovide production subsidies that can correct upstream market failures (like imperfect
competition or network externalities) and downstream externalities.5 In an application to
renewable energy, she finds that the global emissions externalities are far more consequential
than market power by technology firms. This framework thus does not make a case that
restricting the use of upstream subsidies enhances global welfare. By contrast, the “protection for
sale” theory initiated by Grossman and Helpman (1994, 1995) explains excess protectionism
with a model of industry group lobbying that distorts the government’s objective function away
from pure welfare. This political distortion does set the stage for multilateral agreements limiting
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Fischer, Greaker and Rosendahl (2014, 2016) consider strategic subsidy policies with environmental
consequences in somewhat different frameworks among Cournot duopolies (with no third market). Other
well-known studies in the environmental economics literature have considered strategic policy responses
to trade and market structure (e.g., Barrett 1994, Conrad 1993), and a recent study by but they have
ignored the important distinction between upstream providers of abatement technologies and downstream
sectors deploying them (Greaker and Rosendahl 2008).

subsidies to improve global welfare. However, this literature has traditionally ignored
transboundary environmental spillovers.6
Renewable energy is an interesting application because of its central role in green
industrial policy, its potential to generate spillover benefits, the multiple policy levers brought to
bear, and the multiple objectives expressed (Fischer and Preonas 2010). The European
Parliament, in adopting the 20/20/20 Directive, justified the renewable energy targets as
“promoting the security of energy supply, promoting technological development and innovation
and providing opportunities for employment and regional development, especially in rural and
isolated areas …, [increasing] export prospects, social cohesion and employment opportunities
… [for small] independent energy producers” (EU 2009, 16).7 In 2012, the value of EU
interventions for renewable energy exceeded the value of all the emissions trading allowances
allocated for the year.8 Renewable energy is also contentious in trade: in addition to the abovementioned disputes, both the United States and the European Union have initiated antidumping
measures against Chinese solar panels in recent years. Meanwhile, climate finance plays a
growing part in international architectures: the Paris Agreement included commitments to
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An exception is Margolis et al (2005), who look at invasive species issues.
As further evidence of the broad link between GIP and employment objectives, during the Great
Recession, the European Union devoted 59% of its stimulus to green projects, while individual member
states and the United States each allocated on average about 11% of their stimulus packages, and China
spent 38% on green projects; globally, 9% of green stimulus was spent on renewable energy specifically
(Robins et al 2009).
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Alberici et al (2014) find that “in 2012, the total value of public interventions in energy (excluding
transport) in the EU-28 is €2012 122 billion,” with €2012 41 billion for renewable energy (p. i-ii). For
2012, the annual allocation of allowances was 2170 million; at an average annual price of roughly €7, the
value of the annual cap was just over €2012 15 billion. Sources: http://www.eex.com/en/marketdata/emission-allowances/auction-market/european-emission-allowances-auction/european-emissionallowances-auction-download and http://www.eea.europa.eu/data-and-maps/data/data-viewers/emissionstrading-viewer. (Also cited in Fischer 2016).
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delivering climate finance to developing countries of at least $100 billion per year by 2025, with
a large portion devoted to low-carbon energy.9
The next section describes the model framework. Theoretical results isolate the
environmental and political market failures. Then the model is parameterized to represent global
production and deployment of renewable energy technologies and explore optimal policy
strategies. Both sections reveal important trade-offs between allowing and restricting the use of
upstream subsidies. For green goods, allowing upstream subsidies may be useful, especially if
political distortions are large relative to the environmental benefits. For brown goods, restrictions
on upstream subsidies are either useful, if political distortions are large, or ineffectual, as
strategic countries may not want to use them otherwise. These restrictions can be costly,
however, when external environmental benefits are important, and climate finance may only be a
successful alternative if clean technology–exporting countries have strong special interests
lobbying their governments to support foreign markets.

Model framework

The model focuses on the market for a green manufactured good, such as a wind turbine
or solar panel. There are three regions, all of which are consumers of the good, in the sense of
deploying the technology in their downstream electricity sectors. Two of the regions are also
home to producers of the good. Markets are decentralized, and the products are assumed to be
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Climate finance is distinct from the technology transfer envisioned in the Kyoto Protocol. Glachant, Ing
and Nicolai (2016) explore strategic incentives to transfer less polluting technologies to trade partners
when the downstream industries adopting them compete (albeit imperfectly) through international trade.

identical. This static, partial equilibrium model is kept simple to capture the essential features of
the trade and environmental problem.10
Governments in each producing region i  {1, 2} may offer to subsidize downstream
deployment by i and/or to subsidize the production of the upstream technology firms by  i .
The third region’s government makes no interventions (for example, a developing country
without climate policy obligations), leaving 3  0 —that is, unless the producer countries agree
to subsidize deployment there by f i (such as through contributions to climate finance or clean
energy foreign aid), in which case 3  f1  f 2 . This latter policy option will be considered as an
alternative when upstream policies are disallowed. Note that contributions differ from export
subsidies, since they apply to all consumption in the third market, not just the exports of the
country offering the support.
The demand side of the model follows Fischer (2016), as repeated here. Let us assume
the following linear demand functions for the technology in each country, where mi is a measure
of downstream market share of region i (and

m
i

i

 1 ).

11
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Since a green good represents a relatively small sector in the economy, we decline to model general
equilibrium effects. Brander and Spencer (1985) show that with an additive utility function including a
perfectly competitive numeraire good, the results carry through in a general equilibrium model with terms
of trade. We also avoid dynamic effects; policies that stimulate upstream innovation, like R&D subsidies,
generally have the same cost-reducing effect as upstream subsidies, over the longer term. We discuss
some important caveats related to unmodeled scale economies and learning spillovers in the conclusion.
11
One could vary other demand parameters by country, as we do in the numerical simulations, but the
strategic issues related to heterogeneous downstream demand are captured sufficiently by the parameter
m.

Total demand is X  x1  x2  x3 , which gives us an inverse demand function facing the
upstream producers of P  A  BX , where the slope equals the identical individual slopes B  b ,
and the intercept equals the weighted average intercept A  a   , where   i mii .
Consumer surplus is the area under each linear demand curve above the consumer price:
CSi 

mi  a  ( P  i ) 

2

2b

The upstream market is characterized by price-taking firms with an upward-sloping
aggregate supply curve in each producer country. This framework differs from the Cournot
competition assumed in Fischer (2016) and the earlier strategic trade literature; it allows us to
focus on the market failures related to the downstream external benefits and the political
economy, rather than imperfect competition.12 Since we want to think about an international
trade context with multiple producer regions and allow for asymmetric policies and thereby
asymmetric costs, a market structure that gives positive producer surplus is required. With
perfect competition and price-taking firms, one cannot use constant marginal costs, as in Fischer
(2016), because profits would be zero and the least-cost producer would serve the entire market.
Thus, let us assume upward-sloping marginal costs of domestic production, such as can arise
from production lines of heterogeneous producers with limited capacities (as in Laffont and
Tirole 1996).13
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Fischer (2016) explores the interactions with imperfect competition and finds the welfare costs from
that market failure to be small relative to the costs of the downstream externality.
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An alternative structure would be heterogeneous firms with imperfect substitutability (as in Melitz
2003). However, representative supply curves are in better keeping with our numerical parameterization,
which relies on linear demand functions and the assumption of identical products. The important aspect is
simply that we have positive producer surplus, which makes strategic countries want to engage in
industrial policy, in order to influence the terms of trade.

Consider a representative, price-taking firm in each country; marginal costs are linear
with intercept c and slope 2h. Domestic industry profits (for d  {1, 2}, f  {2,1} ) are

 d   P   d  (c  hyd )  yd
From the first-order conditions for each firm  d / yd  P   d  (c  2hyd )  0 ; with
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where   ( 1   2 ) / 2 is the simple average upstream subsidy. The equilibrium price is
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(Note that an equilibrium with both countries producing requires that one does not fill all
global demand by driving the price below the marginal cost at zero production in the other
country:  f   d  h( A  c   d ) / B . Since we will look at symmetric equilibria, this always
holds, but in general it requires a positive h.)
Governments place a value on domestic upstream profits,  i ; domestic downstream
surplus, CSi ; net revenues, TRi ; and global downstream externalities, EG . However, they may
undervalue the external benefits relative to a global planner (vi  vG ) . Furthermore, governments
may have heightened concerns about the clean technology industry’s success because of the
associated jobs, wages, and exports. Let us model this concern by adding weight  in the
domestic objective function to total domestic production of the technology. Though we will not
model the underlying influences explicitly, preferences for establishing and maintaining global

market share may arise from a model of lobbying by industry interest groups, as was well
established by Grossman and Helpman (1994). We use upstream output, rather than profits, as
the metric of interest for the governing politicians14; this choice does not change the results
qualitatively but does render them more transparent.
Total revenues are the cost of the upstream and downstream subsidy payments for a
producer country: TRi   iYi i xi . The external benefits are proportional to consumption of the
product, and we allow different countries to have different global benefits from the
environmental good: EG  1 x1  2 x2  3 x3 . For example, renewable energy use can displace
emissions from fossil energy by factor i in country i.
The objective function for the government of producer region i is
Wi  i  CSi  TRi  vi EG   yi

From the perspective of a global social planner, however, welfare is
WG  1  2  TR1  TR2  CS1  CS2  CS3  vG EG

Optimal and strategic subsidies

The strategic subsidy choice is modeled as a two-stage game. In the first stage of the
game, a region chooses whether and how much to subsidize downstream and upstream. We may
think of this cost subsidy as the net effect of a range of policies, such as direct subsidies, tax
breaks, and low-cost land or financing. In the second stage of the game, international supply and
demand find equilibrium.
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For example, labor interest groups and associated industries in the supply chain may be more interested
in the scale than in the profitability of production.

We compare the optimal subsidy strategy of a global planner with the Nash equilibrium
among the regional governments. In essence, although the firms are price takers, their
governments have market power, and they compete like a duopoly. Each actor maximizes its
welfare function with respect to the policy levers it controls, recognizing the market equilibrium
response to subsidies, and taking as given the policy choices in the other region.
Specifically, the global planner would maximize global welfare with respect to choosing
upstream and downstream subsidies in each producing region; that is,

WG /  1  0, WG / 1  0, WG /  2  0, WG / 2  0. We will consider the case of
symmetric producer regions and thus restrict the optimal upstream subsidies to be symmetric, to
allow better comparison with the noncooperative equilibrium. We also consider the case in
which upstream subsidies are restricted to zero, but contributions to deployment in the third
market can be made:  1  0,  2  0, WG / 1  0, WG / 2 , WG / f1  0, WG / f 2  .
In the Nash game, each producing country maximizes its own welfare, taking as given the
subsidy choices of the other actor and knowing the subsequent effects on the international market
equilibrium. In equilibrium, W1 /  1  0, W1 / 1  0, W2 /  2  0, W2 / 2  0 all must
hold. In the case where upstream subsidies are restricted, we consider

 1  0, W1 / 1  0, W1 / f1  0,  2  0, W2 / 2  0, W2 / f2  0 .
The subsidies have direct and indirect effects on welfare through changes in output and
consumption. Note that from the decentralized problem, i / yi  0 and CSi / xi  0 ,
holding prices fixed, and all price changes amount to global transfers on the margin
(WG / P   i / P   CSi / P   yi   xi  0). Consider the planner’s problem with
i

i

i

i

respect to region 1. Differentiating global welfare in its general form with respect to the upstream
subsidy, we see

dWG 1 TR1 TR1 dx1 TR1 dy1 TR2 dx2 TR2 dy2
E dx
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Similarly, with respect to the downstream subsidy,
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Thus, the planner wants a combination of subsidies to internalize the environmental
externality, such that the last bracketed term equals zero. Note that since the planner is
indifferent to the location of revenue transfers, a choice of contributions for deployment in the
third region will look like dWG / d3 .
From the individual region’s perspective, the subsidy choices are somewhat different:
E dx
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In each case, the first term reflects incentives to influence the terms of trade, to the
extent the region is a net exporter. These terms differ across the policies, since dP / d i  0 while

dP / di  0 and dP / dfi  0. The remaining terms reflect the region’s value of the additional
environmental benefits relative to the additional revenue costs as quantities adjust, as well as any
perceived benefit from expanding production. Notably, in the case of the contributions, the lost
revenue to the government from the transfer abroad imposes a direct negative term; thus, for
contributions to be positive, there must be sufficient benefits in terms of trade, environmental
improvement, and/or having a larger market.

Strategic upstream and downstream subsidies

To begin, let us ignore the option of contributions to foreign deployment and consider
optimal strategies targeting only domestic production and deployment. All results are derived in
the Appendix using our linear functional forms, which provide straightforward relationships for
the equilibrium price and quantity responses embedded in the previous equations. For the most
part, we consider equilibria with symmetric producer countries to focus on the role of the third
market and the different market distortions.

Strategic subsidies without environmental benefits
First, we consider the strategic incentives in the absence of environmental spillovers.
These benchmark subsidies can then be compared with subsidies in the presence of global
environmental externalities.
Proposition 1(a): If vG  0 , then the optimal policy is to have no subsidies ( i*  i*  0) .
In the absence of any market failures, no intervention is necessary. (This obvious result is
stated formally only for symmetry with the subsequent results.)
Proposition 1(b): If vG  0 , and   0 , then the Nash equilibrium has producer countries taxing
upstream and subsidizing downstream by an equivalent amount, to the extent that they are net





Nash
exporters to the third market:  iNash
,vi 0, 0  i ,vi 0, 0 , i  {1, 2} .

Without a downstream externality and without any distortion to the domestic welfare
function, governments still have an incentive to intervene in the market for green goods. Both
taxing upstream and subsidizing downstream serve to drive up global technology prices and
capture rents from the third region. Furthermore, since marginal production costs are increasing
within a country, there may be some incentive to shift the cost of production to the other
producing region.15 For these reasons, the tax/subsidy shift is increasing with the third-party
market share and, up to a point, with the slope of the supply curves.
Proposition 1(c): If vG  0 , and   0 , then in the Nash equilibrium, symmetric producer
countries subsidize downstream and may tax or subsidize upstream; the sum of the upstream and
15

This result stands in contrast to that with Cournot-competing producers with constant marginal costs,
where a positive upstream subsidy is strategically optimal (Fischer 2016). In that case, the upstream
subsidy helps expand market share and profits, without raising production costs. Here, capturing more
market share incurs a deadweight loss from higher total production costs.

downstream subsidies equals the extra weight on production in the objective function



Nash
vi 0



 vNash
 .
i 0
The desire to subsidize upstream producers comes from caring more about upstream

producers than about downstream consumers. Thus, governments are willing to let global prices
be driven down to some extent because the upstream subsidy directly benefits the producing
firms at home. For the net effect to be positive, the upstream subsidy requires   iNash
,vi 0, 0 .
Corrollary: In a symmetric-country duopoly with no third market, strategic downstream
subsidies are zero, and strategic upstream subsidies are  .
If neither country is a net exporter, there is no incentive to influence the terms of trade,
only an incentive to make transfers to the upstream producers.
Note that if   0 , the symmetric duopoly replicates the social optimum with no
subsidies. However, if the downstream demand functions differ, the duopoly equilibrium will
deviate from the social optimum. For example, if one country has a larger downstream
consumption market share (md  m f ) , all else equal, it will tax downstream and set an equal
subsidy upstream, while the exporting country will do the opposite but at different levels. The
net effect of the taxes/subsidies is to reduce total output.
It is worth noting that in this framework, upstream subsidies are negative unless there is a
significant distortion in the regional government’s objective function. This result differs from
that with imperfectly competitive firms with Cournot competition upstream, as case in which
strategic upstream subsidies are positive (Fischer 2016). However, the common point among the
frameworks is that regions tend to provide upstream subsidies that are lower than optimal
(because of the lack of concern for the third-party region), and a distortion like overweighting

production in the government’s objective function is required for a prohibition of positive
upstream subsidies to be welfare enhancing from a global perspective.

Strategic subsidies with environmental benefits
Now suppose that the consumption of the product downstream has an external benefit of

vG per unit, as in the case of an environmental good. At the social optimum, we want the price to
equal the marginal social cost in each downstream country: PD,i*  c  hY  vG i . Since the
externality is downstream, this would suggest implementing the subsidies downstream

(i*  i vG , i) . However, if a third-party country does not have these policy levers at its
disposal, the optimum cannot be achieved with downstream subsidies alone. If the marginal
benefits of the good are equal across all countries (i   , i) , then upstream subsidies of

 1*   2*  vG  alone suffice to achieve the optimum. But when marginal benefits differ, a
combination of upstream and downstream subsidies is needed to maximize welfare.
We find the following results with strategic subsidies:
Proposition 2: The globally optimal policy is to subsidize upstream at the rate of the thirdcountry marginal benefit, and to subsidize consumption in the producer countries according to
the difference in the marginal benefit from that of the third country:



*
1

  2*   *  vG 3 ; i*  vG (i  3 ) , i  {1, 2} .
With an external environmental benefit from downstream consumption, the planner

wants the total subsidy in each country to equal the social marginal benefit; that is,

 *  i*  vG i , i . If subsidies cannot be implemented in the third-party country, the optimal
strategy is to use the uniform upstream subsidy to reflect the third country’s external benefit,
while downstream subsidies (or taxes) are used in the producer countries to adjust net subsidy.
Proposition 3: In the Nash equilibrium, the sum of the subsidies equals the marginal benefit as
valued by that country, plus the government’s weight on production:

 iNash  iNash  vi i  , i  {1, 2} .
The individual subsidies combine the cost-shifting components defined in the subsection
above with an external benefit component that is positive and increasing in proportion to vi .
Since the upstream and downstream cost-shifting components offset each other, it is the sum of
the external benefit components that equals the valued marginal benefit. In other words, for

i  {1, 2},  iNash (vi )   iNash (0)  iup (vi ); iNash (vi )  iNash (0)  idown (vi ); and iup  idown  i vi .
Corollary: Without a third country, in a symmetric Nash equilibrium, the noncooperative
subsidies replicate the social optimum if each country values environmental changes at the
global marginal benefit and   0 .
This follows from Proposition 3; under these conditions, neither county is a net exporter
and does not want to distort the terms of trade. Thus, if vi  vG , then

 iNash  iNash  vG i   i* i* . To internalize the externality, the countries combine upstream and
downstream subsidies in such a way that the total subsidies equal those desired by the planner for
each region, assuming they adopt the global valuation of the externality. In this case, the planner
is indifferent as to where to target the subsidies because only the sum matters.

Proposition 4: With a third country, a symmetric Nash equilibrium provides lower
environmental gains than is optimal to the extent that m3  0 and 3  0 , even if vi  vG , unless

 is sufficiently large.
Although strategic countries may care about the global costs of foreign emissions, the
incentive to maintain higher export prices remains (through higher downstream subsidies and
lower upstream subsidies than the planner would prefer), resulting in global underprovision of
the green good. This underprovision is further exacerbated to the extent that global gains are
undervalued locally. The exception is if the preference for domestic production is sufficiently
strong that it drives upstream subsidies high enough to induce more global reductions. In this
sense, the political economy distortion can be a friend to the environment.

Contributions to climate finance
If upstream policies are prohibited, an alternative mechanism is to encourage the
producer regions to contribute to financing deployment in the rest of the world (ROW). In a
sense, contributions subsidize exports; however, they also subsidize the exports of the
competitor, so another type of free-riding problem exists.
We derive the following results:
Proposition 5: The social planner is indifferent between subsidizing deployment in ROW and
subsidizing upstream manufacturing.
The social planner merely seeks to ensure that the net subsidy in each region equals the
marginal external benefit. If the planner cannot set that subsidy directly in the third region, it can
do it either through the upstream subsidy or through climate finance.

Proposition 6: In the Nash equilibrium, with no environmental externality and no policy
restrictions, strategic countries would subsidize upstream but tax downstream if they could also
tax ROW deployment.
Taxing ROW deployment is essentially a way of raising revenues and returning rents
from the third region. The domestic downstream tax is perfectly offset by the upstream subsidy.
To the extent that governments overweight producer surplus, the upstream subsidy will be even
higher. Obviously, such a policy (taxing foreign consumption) is not feasible, but it illustrates the
strategic incentives.

The following set of propositions reveals that producing countries do not have an
inherent interest in subsidizing foreign deployment, just as they will not provide positive
upstream subsidies, unless the political distortion or external benefit is sufficiently large.
Furthermore, when that is the case, they still prefer to subsidize at home rather than abroad, to
keep more rents at home.
Proposition 7(a): If upstream interventions are not allowed and there are no political or
environmental distortions, strategic countries in the Nash equilibrium would tax downstream
consumption at home to the extent that the ROW has market share, and they would also like to
tax ROW consumption.
Proposition 1(b) found that in the absence of other market failures, strategic countries
would like to tax upstream production to the extent that the ROW has market share. Thus, when
that upstream policy lever is removed, the countries would like to tax all downstream
consumption, although in this case they are restricted to home and ROW. With that desire, and

the additional incentive of shifting more rents from ROW through the tax directly, the
strategically optimal domestic downstream subsidy is negative.
Proposition 7(b): If upstream interventions are not allowed, symmetric strategic countries will
subsidize both downstream consumption at home and in ROW only if the overweighting of
production or their value of the external benefit is sufficiently large.
Both concern about domestic production and concern about the global environment lead
the producing country to want to expand the global market for its upstream producers. However,
these concerns must be sufficiently large to overcome the incentives from Proposition 7(a) to tax
downstream deployment. The Appendix demonstrates this result for the case in which the
marginal external benefits of deployment are equal across countries; from that point, increasing

3 alone would increase foreign contributions and decrease domestic deployment subsidies, in
order to shift more deployment where it is more valuable.
Proposition 7(c): Domestic downstream subsidies are strictly larger than foreign contributions if
the marginal external benefits are equal.
Strategic countries would prefer to subsidize at home more than abroad, for the same
environmental effects. However, if the external benefits in ROW are sufficiently large, more
support will be allocated to foreign contributions.

To summarize the theoretical results, we have found that for goods without
environmental benefits, restrictions on upstream subsidies are either useful (if   0 ) or
ineffectual (if  N  0 ). For green goods, allowing upstream subsidies may be useful, especially if

  0 . Climate finance, on the other hand, will only be a good substitute measure if   0 and
producing countries do not undervalue the global external benefits.

A numerical application to renewable energy

The theoretical analysis draws intuition for situations in which strategic trade partners
may underprovide production subsidies in the presence of market failures. In this section, we
explore these results quantitatively in a parameterized application to the renewable energy
technology sector.
The downstream side of the numerical model is identical to that of Fischer (2016). It
represents the producer-consumer regions of Europe, the United States, and China, as well as and
consumption in the rest of the world. Each region has a downstream market for electricity
generation that is closed to international trade (this framework could be applied equally to
renewable fuels in transportation). The downstream markets consist of representative firms
located and owned in the corresponding regions, and competition is perfect.16 Electricity
generation with conventional fossil-fueled technologies (coal, oil, and gas-fired generation) leads
to emissions of CO2, a global pollutant. Renewable energy technologies, such as solar panels and
wind turbines, produce electricity without emissions. Hydropower and nuclear capacity are
available but are assumed not to benefit from the subsidy policies (although they may benefit
indirectly from CO2 taxes if implemented).

16

The primary assumption is that the fossil supply curve is upward sloping and cost increases are fully

passed through. This assumption is less realistic for China, where prices are regulated and adjusted
infrequently.

All technology demand functions are linear and based on simplified static versions of the
calibrated electricity sector models in Fischer, Newell and Preonas (2013) for the United States
and in Hübler, Schenker, and Fischer (2015) for the European Union.17 The data represent annual
electricity production in a near-term horizon of 2015–2020. Nonhydro renewables (wind,
biomass, solar, etc.) are aggregated, with wind being the dominant source. These renewables
represent 17% of EU electricity demand and 7% of US demand in the baseline. Incremental
renewables also displace fossil energy to different extents; the marginal emissions rates from
displacing nonrenewable sources are twice as high in the United States as in the European Union.
For China and ROW, the model uses as the baseline supply mix the projections for 2020
in the 2013 International Energy Outlook (EIA 2013). The slopes of the supply curves are
calibrated to match the same supply elasticities as in the United States, in the absence of data to
calibrate them directly, and China and ROW have levels of fossil fuel reliance more like US than
EU levels. We note that by 2020, the US and EU electricity markets are projected to be similar in
size to each other, while the Chinese power sector will be nearly twice as large, and ROW almost
four times as large, making it also the biggest market for renewable energy.
The model incorporates the downstream subsidies in the nonhydro renewable energy
demand functions, including EU , US , CN , and ROW  f EU  fUS  fCN . 18 The result is a series of
linear downstream demands for renewable energy technology, as a function of the after-subsidy
prices.
The upstream market follows that of the analytical section, which differs from Fischer
(2016). Since wind is the dominant technology, the allocation of the upstream renewable
17

These models were designed for looking at endogenous technical change across two stages; to create a
static model, we use the first stage only.
18
The model can allow carbon prices  i that vary across regions, but these scenarios are not explored in
this paper.

technology supply is stylized on the global wind turbine manufacturing sector. Nine of the top
ten producers are from the United States and China (one is from India), and they provide 70% of
global production (REN21 2013). Of these ten producers, Europe has roughly twice the market
share of the United States and China. Thus, the model allocates half of baseline global renewable
energy supply to the European Union and one quarter each to the United States and China. The
baseline technology price (measured in $/kWh generated) is assumed to equal the lowest of the
electricity prices among the downstream markets, such that renewable energy is competitive in
the baseline. The supply curves are assumed to begin at the origin and run through the baseline
supply quantity at the baseline technology price.

Scenarios
The scenarios explore three main policy combinations:
1. upstream and downstream subsidies are both available;
2. upstream interventions are restricted and only downstream subsidies are available;
and
3. downstream subsidies are combined with contributions to climate finance for
deployment in ROW.
The optimal and Nash subsidies are solved for a range of values of the SCC. Since China
does not find it in its interest to make climate finance contributions unless it uses a carbon value
in excess of $100/ton CO2, we assume contributions are made by the United States and the
European Union alone, also more in keeping with obligations under the Paris Agreement.
Each case is valued assuming either no political distortion or assuming  = $0.10/kWh,
which is a similar scale to adding the total value of sales to the government’s objective function.

Results
To focus on the role of upstream subsidies, let us first compare the optimal subsidies to
the Nash subsidies without and with the overweighting of production. Then, the effects of
restrictions on upstream subsidies and the effectiveness of contributions to ROW deployment as
an alternative will be analyzed.
In the next cases, the results assume that regions value CO2 at the global SCC. This
assumption avoids the issue of undervaluation and keeps the focus on the distortion from
overweighting.
Figure 1 depicts the optimal upstream subsidies (denoted *) and the Nash subsidies, both
without any political distortion (no additional notation) and with the overweighting of production
(denoted +), as a function of the SCC, when the three producer countries are free to choose both

 i and i . Note that the European Union, the largest net exporter, picks the lowest subsidy,
followed by the United States and China. The optimal subsidies are uniformly higher than the
Nash subsidies in the absence of overweighting (as predicted by the theory). With the degree of
overweighting chosen, the Nash subsidies are higher than the optimal subsidies until the SCC
gets very large ($200/ton CO2).
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Figure 1: Optimal and strategic upstream subsidies as function of SCC

Thus, overweighting can be a friend to the environment, but it can in a sense be too friendly: at
lower values of the SCC, the optimal subsidy is closer to zero than the Nash subsidies. Thus, we
see that absent a global externality, the WTO has a strong case to place restrictions on upstream
subsidies.
To what extent, then, are contributions a useful alternative to addressing an externality
when upstream subsidies are restricted? First, consider the incentives to provide them. Figure 2
plots the Nash contributions when they are completely unconstrained. We see that—with the
exception of the European Union when it overweights production—the producer countries would
like to tax foreign deployment unless the SCC is quite high. (This behavior allows them to
transfer rents from export markets, raising revenues and offering larger subsidies at home.)
China in particular, as the smallest net exporter, does not want to contribute to climate finance

unless the SCC is well over $100. For this reason, in subsequent scenarios, we restrict China’s
contributions to zero.
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Figure 2: Strategic contributions to ROW deployment

We can understand these results by exploring the net subsidies in the various equilibria.
Figure 3 shows the total effective subsidies ( i   ) for the European Union and ROW in the
standard, overweighting, and optimal cases, as a function of the SCC, when upstream subsidies
can be freely chosen and no direct contributions are made to foreign deployment. At these SCC
levels, optimal total subsidies for the relatively clean European Union are smaller than the Nash
combinations, especially with overweighting of production, while optimal total subsidies for
ROW are higher than in the standard Nash equilibrium but lower than with overweighting of
production.
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Figure 3: Total effective subsidies when upstream subsidies are unconstrained

Figure 4 shows the total subsidies when only downstream subsidies and climate finance
are allowed ( i , in this case). With these restrictions, the Nash subsidies for the producer regions
are below the optimal subsidies, even with overweighting, because of the loss of the upstream
subsidy. With overweighting, however, contributions can lead to higher-than-optimal subsidies
in ROW.
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Figure 4: Total effective subsidies with downstream subsidies and contributions to ROW
deployment

What are the welfare consequences of restrictions on upstream subsidies or the use of
contributions? Figures 3, 4, and 5 compare the welfare change from no policy of the Nash
equilibria, as a share of the welfare improvement from optimal subsidies, for an SCC of $30,
$100, and $200, respectively.
In Figure 3, with an SCC of $30, we observe a large welfare loss from regions freely
choosing subsidies when they overweight production. In that case, disallowing upstream
subsidies eliminates the loss and leads to a small welfare gain. On the other hand, in the absence
of the political distortion, the restriction on subsidy policy leads to a loss of nearly half the gains
from the unrestricted Nash policy response. Contributions in this figure are made by the
European Union only when it overweights production, resulting in a small improvement over
downstream subsidies alone.
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Figure 5: Welfare change (as share of change with optimal subsidies) by policy tools and political
distortions; SCC = $30

With an SCC of $100 (Figure 6), restrictions are still beneficial with our political
distortion and costly if not. In this range, the United States and the European Union both provide
positive climate finance in both the standard and political distortion cases. Those contributions to
foreign deployment improve global welfare by more than a third when governments do not
overweight production, and nearly double it when they do. Recall from Figure 1 that in this
situation, upstream subsidies are too high with political distortions and too low without; Figure 3
showed that foreign contributions are still too low with an SCC of $100, but the welfare gains are
larger with foreign contributions than with upstream subsidies when the political distortion is
present. Absent that distortion, however, welfare is higher allowing for upstream subsidies.
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Figure 6: Welfare change (as share of change with optimal subsidies) by policy tools and political
distortions; SCC = $100

With an SCC of $200 (Figure 7), restricting the use of upstream subsidies diminishes
welfare whether or not governments overweight production. However, contributions to climate
finance more than offset the loss when governments overweight, but less so when they do not. In
this case—of very high global external benefits which the governments value fully—climate
finance and upstream subsidies lead to more similar outcomes for global welfare.
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Figure 7: Welfare change (as share of change with optimal subsidies) by policy tools and political
distortions; SCC = $200

All of the preceding scenarios assume that governments value global emissions at the
global SCC; suppose they undervalue the global benefits of the green technologies? Figure 8
considers this case when the SCC is $100 but countries value the benefits at $30. With
undervaluation, Nash strategies using upstream subsidies achieve most of the potential welfare
gains from subsidies, whether or not there is a political distortion. Restricting the use of upstream
subsidies forgoes a majority of those welfare gains, and climate finance only recaptures a small
fraction, since at a carbon value of $30, only the European Union is willing to contribute modest
support to deployment in ROW.

Standard welfare

Weight upstream

0.9
0.8

0.7
0.6
0.5
0.4
0.3

0.2
0.1
0.0
Nash with upstream
subsidies

Nash with only
Nash with contributions
downstream subsidies
to ROW

Figure 8: Welfare change (as share of change with optimal subsidies) by policy tools and political
distortions; SCC = $30

Conclusion

Green industrial policy raises important questions about the interaction between
environmental and free-trade goals as applied to goods with global external benefits. In
particular, this analysis reveals rationales both for allowing and for restricting the use of
upstream subsidies. In the absence of uninternalized environmental benefits, restricting upstream
subsidies either does no harm (since strategic countries may not want to use them anyway) or
provides global welfare benefits by impeding domestic political distortions from interfering with
trade. On the other hand, such restrictions can do more harm than good if the environmental
benefits outweigh the political distortion. Indeed, if governments undervalue the global external

benefit, the political distortion can be a friend to the environment, if countries are free to use all
subsidy tools.
Given restrictions on upstream subsidies, an alternative policy in which producer
countries finance deployment in third-party markets can recoup some of the lost welfare.
However, this option is most effective when those producer countries both perceive a high value
in the global environmental benefit and have a high degree of political distortions to their trade
policies.
These issues are particularly relevant for climate policies and markets for low-carbon
technologies. The Paris Agreement codifies an international system of differentiated and
voluntary climate policy formation, and the slow progress of emissions pricing means that most
emissions are not internalized by energy markets. In the face of carbon leakage, countries that
take into account the SCC may continue to eschew carbon pricing in favor of technology
policies, which benefit from much greater public support. Toward that end, the most valuable
policies are those that will lower the cost of low-carbon technologies for the entire world, but
particularly for developing countries whose energy demand growth far outstrips that anticipated
among developed nations. Here, upstream subsidies clearly meet that objective, as can
contributions to climate finance as well. The disadvantage of climate finance is that such
contributions benefit domestic industry only in part, and in practice, these shares are further
diluted by the large portfolio of activities foreseen by the Green Climate Fund, of which clean
energy deployment is just a part. Strategic countries thus prefer upstream subsidies, and the key
question is whether some leeway for green industrial policy should be provided in trade rules, in
an attempt to harness these selfish incentives for the global good.

Underlying this analysis is the standard assumption that global supply curves for the
green good are upward sloping and that downstream demand for the good is downward sloping.
As such, the qualitative results should be robust to other applications. However, some aspects
relevant to emerging clean technologies have not been included. In particular, characteristics that
might render the supply curve downward sloping—such as scale economies, learning-by-doing,
and international innovation spillovers—would change the results, as then downstream subsidies
can have the effect of lowering global prices as well. These aspects will be the subject of future
analysis.
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Appendix

Analytical results
To avoid tedious algebraic manipulations, the optimal and Nash solutions are solved in
Mathematica using the linear functional forms, and the results are reported here. To provide core
intuition without unnecessary complications, the reported results generally assume symmetric
producer countries. The notebook file with proofs is available from the author upon request.

No downstream externality
Proof of Proposition 1(b)
When vi  0 , and   0, the regional government’s first-order conditions simplify to
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with symmetric results for region 2.
We can simplify these expressions with our functional forms and solve for the Nash
equilibrium. The effect of the third-party market is best seen with the assumption of symmetry
across the producing countries: that is, m1  m2  (1  m3 ) / 2. The symmetric Nash solution yields

iNash  m3

hb(a  c)
0
(b  h)  m3 (2(b  h)  hm3 )
2

 iNash  iNash  0
Thus, we see the tax/subsidy shift is strictly increasing in m3 . It is also increasing in h, at
least initially. Furthermore, when m3  0 and   0, symmetric countries have no subsidies in
equilibrium.
Proof of Proposition 1(c)
When   0 , the symmetric Nash solution is
hb(a  c  w)
0
Z
 iNash  w

iNash  m3
 iNash
where Z  (b  h)2  m3h(2(b  h)  hm3 )
Furthermore,  Nash  0 if

  m3

hb(a  c)
.
Z

Thus, the larger the third-party market share, the higher is this threshold for wanting a
positive upstream subsidy.
Discussion of asymmetric firms
With no third-party country, the asymmetric Nash solution yields

 1Nash  1Nash 
Y

Nash

(a  c)bh m
 2Nash   2Nash
2(b  h)(b  h  h m )

(a  c)bh m 2
Y  
0
2(b  h)(b  h  h m ) 2
*

where m  m1  m2 is the extent to which country 1 has a larger market share.

Downstream externality
For the proof of optimal strategies without and with an externality, we derive the
analytical solutions in Mathematica and report simplified results here.
Proof of Proposition 3
Although the value of an individual subsidy is a complicated expression, without relying
on the symmetry assumptions, with our functional forms, iNash   iNash  ui vi  .
For example of the individual subsidies, when vi  v, i  {1, 2}, and i   , i, the
symmetric Nash solution yields
vub(b  h(1  m3 ))
0
Z
vub(b  h(1  m3 ))
 iNash (v)   iNash (0)  vu 
0
Z

iNash (v)  iNash (0) 

Proof of Proposition 4
This result essentially requires 3  0 and m3  0. We show the result for the case of
symmetric producer countries that value the externality at the global value (that is, v2  v1  vG
and m1  m2  (1  m3 ) / 2 ), and when the marginal external benefit is the same across countries

(i   i) , so the location of deployment does not matter. The difference in global deployment
is a function of the difference between the Nash and globally optimal upstream subsidies, as well
as the political distortion:

Y Nash  Y * 

m3 ( Nash   * ) (1  m3 )


bh
bh

If   0, then  Nash   * and Y Nash  Y * . If the political distortion is large enough,
deployment may be even higher with the Nash equilibrium among strategic countries. However,
if 3   , there is the additional problem that strategic countries deploy too little abroad,
reducing the external benefits achieved under the Nash equilibrium.

Contributions to climate finance
Proof of Proposition 5
If the planner cannot use upstream subsidies, the optimal contributions, split equally, are

fi* 

3vG
2

and the optimal downstream subsidies in producing countries remain the same.
Proof of Proposition 6
In the symmetric Nash equilibrium with v = 0,
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where Z2   3(b  h)  hm3  b  h  hm3   0 .

Proof of Proposition 7
In the symmetric Nash equilibrium with i   , i,
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